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Abstract
Private quantum money allows a bank to mint quantum money
states that it can later verify, but that no one else can forge. In clas-
sically verifiable quantum money – introduced by Gavinsky [Gav12]–
the verification is done via an interactive protocol between the bank
and the user, where the communication is classical, and the compu-
tational resources required of the bank are classical. In this work,
we consider memoryless interactive protocols in which the minting is
likewise classical, and construct a private money scheme that achieves
these two notions simultaneously (i.e., classical verification and clas-
sical minting). We call such a construction a private semi-quantum
money scheme, since the bank does not need any quantum resources.
In terms of techniques, our main contribution is a strong parallel
repetition theorem for Noisy Trapdoor Claw Free Functions (NTCF),
a notion introduced by Brakerski et al. [BCM+18].
1 Introduction
Introduced by Wiesner circa 1969, quantum money was the precursor to
what is now known as quantum cryptography [Wie83]. The motivation be-
hind quantum money is to design money that is physically impossible to
counterfeit, by using a variant of the (quantum) no-cloning theorem [WZ82,
Par70, Die82]. This notion of quantum money is in sharp contrast to our
current notions of bills and coins that, at least in principle, can be counter-
feited.
All quantum money schemes consist of three parts: key-gen, which gen-
erates a key, mint which uses the key to issue a new quantum money state,
and verify which tests whether an alleged money state is legitimate. There
are two main categories of quantum money: private and public. In a private
setting, the key is required to run the verification. On the other hand, in a
public quantum money scheme, key-gen generates a secret/public key-pair,
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where the secret key is used in mint and the public key is used in verify. In
this work we will focus mainly on private quantum money schemes.
A variant of quantum money called classically verifiable quantum money
was introduced in [Gav12] (see also [GK15, PYJ+12, BS16a]): the money
is verified via an interactive protocol between the user and the bank that
requires a quantum computer for the user, a classical computer for the bank,
and classical communication between them.
In this work, we introduce a new variant of classically verifiable quantum
money: semi-quantum money. In this setting, the minting also shares this
property, i.e., it is a protocol that involves both the bank and the user,
and requires only classical resources from the bank. In standard quantum
money, in contrast, minting is a quantum algorithm run by the bank, which
sends the output – the quantum money state – to the user, via a quantum
channel.
In semi-quantum money, the money state is generated by the user –
this concept seems somewhat counter intuitive with regard to the standard
notion of banks; if banknotes are generated by the user, couldn’t the user
create as many notes as he or she pleases? The key point of the minting
process is the protocol between the user and the bank: the user is supposed
to generate a superposition over two registers using information provided
by the bank, measure one of the registers, and report the result back to
the bank. If the user will try to repeat the same procedure, the measure-
ment outcome – as well as the post-measured state – will be different with
overwhelming probability. As far as the authors are aware, no prior work
considered classical minting.
The fact that semi-quantum money is also classically verifiable means
that instead of sending the quantum state to the bank for verification, the
user and the bank run a classical interactive verification protocol that tests
the validity of the money. Semi-quantum money got its name from the fact
that the minting and verification protocols require only classical resources
(communication and computation) from the bank.
This introduction of a quantum money scheme where the banks are clas-
sical perhaps raises the question whether the concept could be improved,
such that the bank would be quantum and the user classical. However, such
a setting is inherently flawed; if the user is classical, they could not hold
their own money, meaning the bank would have to hold the state of every
note of every user1. This makes the “quantumness” of the money redundant,
since it would be permanently kept within the bank in any case. Thus, it
would seem that the setting where the bank and communication is classical
and the user is quantum is the “least quantum” a quantum money scheme
could be.
1We refer to such a scheme as “memory-dependent”, and explore its consequences in
Appendix D.
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In this work we present a construction for private semi-quantum money.
However, the notion of semi-quantum money naturally lends itself to the
public setting. In a future version we intend to present public semi-quantum
money, based on the quantum lightning construction of [Zha19] and Co-
ladangelo’s follow-up work [Col19] which introduced the notion of bolt-to-
certificate. Public schemes have a major advantage over private schemes
in terms of privacy: in a public scheme, any user can verify a banknote
without aid from the bank. Thus, the bank cannot track all transactions of
the note; only those made directly with it. It is much harder to construct
a secure public scheme, however. Our classical verification based on [Col19]
will be memory-dependent, meaning the bank has to keep a database of
spent notes. We leave it as an open question whether a memoryless public
semi-quantum money exists (we compare memory-dependent vs. memory-
less quantum money in Appendix D).
Our main result is:
Theorem 1.1 (Main Theorem). Assuming that the Learning With Errors
(LWE) problem with certain parameters is hard for BQP and that a post-
quantum existentially unforgeable under an adaptive chosen message attack
MAC (Definition 23) and an encryption scheme with post-quantum indis-
tinguishability under adaptive chosen plaintext attack (Definition 21) exist,
then a secure semi-quantum private money scheme exists (Definition 12).
The main technical tool through which to implement this scheme is the
quantum secure trapdoor claw-free function (TCF – Appendix C) recently
introduced in [BCM+18] (see also [Mah18a, Mah18b, GV19]). Informally,
a quantum secure TCF is a family of functions, where each function f :
{0, 1}w → {0, 1}w in the family (a) is classically efficiently computable, (b)
is 2-to-1, i.e., for every x there exists a unique x′ 6= x such that f(x) = f(x′),
and (c) has a trapdoor that, given y, can be used to find x and x′ such
that f(x) = f(x′) = y (when y is in the image of f), but without the
trapdoor a quantum polynomial adversary cannot find any pair x, x′ such
that f(x) = f(x′).
In addition, we will require the adaptive hardcore bit property of a TCF
that was introduced in [BCM+18], which is explained below. Using a quan-
tum computer, the state 1√2(|x〉+ |x′〉), where x and x′ are two pre-images of
y, could be measured, and one pre-image of y could be found. Moreover, by
measuring the state in the Hadamard basis, a non-zero string d that satisfies
d · (x⊕ x′) = 0 could be extracted:
H⊗w
1√
2
(|x〉+ |x′〉) = 1√
2w+1
∑
d∈{0,1}w
(−1)d·x + (−1)d·x′ |d〉
= 1√
2w−1
∑
d∈{0,1}w|d·(x⊕x′)=0
(−1)d·x|d〉
(1)
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In our construction we use the following two tests: the pre-image test (pro-
viding a pre-image of y) and the equation test (providing a non-zero d that
satisfies the above condition). The adaptive hardcore bit property guaran-
tees that, even though either test on its own can be easily passed, it is hard
(for a quantum polynomial time (QPT) adversary) to successfully pass both
tests with a probability that is noticeably higher than 12 . Brakerski et al.
showed a construction of a noisy trapdoor claw-free function (NTCF) that
holds this adaptive hardcore property, based on the hardness of the Learning
With Errors (LWE) problem [BCM+18]. For the sake of clarity, we ignore
the issues related to the noisy property in this introduction.
A TCF on its own, however, is not hard enough to construct a money
scheme with; we do not want adversaries to be able to forge banknotes with
probability 12 . To that end, we would like to amplify the hardness using
some sort of a parallel repetition theorem (see Section 2.3). Luckily, we
can rephrase this setting using the framework of weakly verifiable puzzles for
which a (perfect) parallel repetition theorem is known [CHS05]. This parallel
repetition guarantees that answering both tests for n puzzles correctly is as
hard as trying to answer them independently, i.e., at most
(
1
2
)n
(up to
negligible corrections), which is exactly our goal.
Next, we present the outline and analysis of our semi-quantum private
money scheme construction. The security notion of our money scheme is
rather straightforward: an adversary that receives ` banknotes, and can
attempt to pass verification (polynomially) many times, cannot pass more
than ` verifications. To show a construction that meets this notion, we
work our way through several weaker security notions; this makes proving
the security of our full scheme construction simpler. We first show how
to construct a semi-quantum money scheme (Section 3) that provides a
weaker level of security than a full scheme. Here, we wish to show that a
counterfeiter that receives 1 quantum money state cannot create two states
that will both pass verification with non-negligible probability. We call a
scheme that satisfies this weaker notion of security a 2-of-2 mini-scheme –
see Definition 14.
We now describe the construction of a 2-of-2 mini-scheme, starting with
the (honest) minting protocol. The bank picks n functions f1, . . . , fn uni-
formly at random from the TCF family and sends them to the user, while
keeping the trapdoors t1, . . . , tn private. The user creates a superposition
of the form |ψ1〉 ⊗ . . .⊗ |ψn〉, where |ψi〉 = 1√2w
∑
x∈{0,1}w |x〉 ⊗ |fi(x)〉. The
user measures all the r.h.s. registers (i.e., |fi(x)〉 ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n) and sends the
resulting y1, . . . , yn to the bank, who saves them to its database2. Note that
2We deviate here slightly from the formal definitions; Since the bank does not have
a “database”, verification should only use the key. This is handled by using a message
authentication code (MAC) and by returning to the user a tag for these values, and then
verifying that tag during the verification. For the sake of clarity, we omit this part in the
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due to the measurement, the ith state collapses to |ψyi〉 = 1√2(|xi〉 + |x′i〉),
where fi(xi) = fi(x′i) = yi.
For verification, the bank chooses a random challenge Ci ∈R {0, 1}
(which is either the pre-image or the equation challenge) for each of the
n registers. For the pre-image challenge, Ci = 0, the user must provide a
string xi such that fi(xi) = yi. The honest user can measure |ψyi〉 to find a
pre-image of yi to pass this test with certainty. In the equation challenge,
Ci = 1, the user must provide a non-zero string di ∈ {0, 1}w such that
di ·(xi⊕x′i) = 0. The bank can test whether the equation challenge holds by
using the trapdoor ti to calculate both xi and x′i. An honest user can gen-
erate such a string by measuring |ψyi〉 in the Hadamard basis, as described
in Eq. (1). The measured di will be non-zero (except with probability expo-
nentially small in w) which will allow the user to pass this test.
We emphasize that for both the minting and the verification protocols,
the bank only needs a classical computer.
We now outline the security argument. Suppose the user tries to pass
verification twice. Denote by C ∈ {0, 1}n the challenge vector in the first
attempt, denote by C ′ the challenge vector in the second attempt, and
denote by S the set of coordinates in which they differ: S = {i ∈ [n]|Ci 6=
C ′i}. With overwhelming probability, S 6= ∅, in which case for at least one
coordinate the user will have to pass both challenges, and cannot succeed
except with negligible probability.
The construction above is a semi-quantum 2-of-2 mini-scheme (rather
than a full blown scheme). There is a slightly stronger notion of security
(that is still weaker than a full blown scheme) called a mini-scheme (adapted
from Aaronson and Christiano [AC13]). In a mini-scheme, the counterfeiter
is given a single quantum money state and can attempt to pass verification
polynomially many times. The counterfeiter succeeds if at least two of these
verifications are accepted. We show in Section 3.2 that the scheme above
also achieves this stronger notion.
In a full quantummoney scheme, the adversary can ask for tmoney states
and must pass at least t+ 1 verifications. Aaronson and Christiano [AC13]
defined the notion of a public money mini-scheme and showed how such
a mini-scheme can be lifted to a full-blown scheme. Ben-David and Sat-
tath [BS16a] showed a similar result that lifts a private money mini-scheme
to a full-blown scheme. In this work, we show how to lift an interactive
private money mini-scheme to a full-blown scheme. The goal of such a
mapping is to ensure that the scheme can support the issuance of multiple
money states without increasing the key-size. This is done by using an au-
thenticated encryption scheme for the mini-scheme keys and including that
authenticated ciphertext as part of the money. As part of the verification,
the bank can later decrypt the mini-scheme key, and use it to run the original
discussion – refer to Algorithm 3 to see how we work around this issue.
5
mini-scheme verification. It is important that the encryption scheme be au-
thenticated to prevent the adversary from altering that information (which
would be possible if, for example, the encryption scheme was malleable).
Related works. The security of private quantum money schemes is gener-
ally solid, [Wie83, MVW13, PYJ+12, TOI03, MS10, Gav12, GK15, JLS18],
while secure public quantum money is much harder to construct. The con-
structions of [Aar09] and [AC13] were broken in Refs. [LAF+10, PDF+18],
respectively. The only two constructions that are not known to be broken are
in [FGH+12, Zha19] (see also [Lut11]) and are based either on non-standard
assumptions or on generic primitives for which no candidate constructions
exist.
Our contribution. Our contribution is twofold: the first, naturally, is
private semi-quantum money: a new model of private quantum money that
requires no quantum communication, and only a classical bank. The main
advantage of the new scheme compared to previous quantum money schemes
is the following: the new scheme could be used without quantum communi-
cation infrastructure. Classical communication has several interesting bene-
fits over quantum communication. The most obvious one is that a classical
communication infrastructure already exists; a semi-quantum money scheme
– unlike previous money schemes – will not require quantum communication
infrastructure. Implementing such an infrastructure on a global scale will be
expensive and challenging, and might be realized years after efficient quan-
tum computers are commonly used. There are other benefits to classical
communication, even if quantum communication infrastructure was readily
available. First, due to the no-cloning theorem, quantum information can-
not be re-sent. In the context of quantum money, data-loss is extremely
problematic – data loss means lost money. Quantum communication will
naturally suffer more data-loss, at least initially. Second, for classical com-
munication we can keep a record (and even a signed record) which helps with
matters of dispute resolution, auditing and error-handling, whereas quan-
tum communication cannot be logged. The same argument can be made for
the banks themselves; classical banks could more easily keep records and be
audited.
The second contribution is the parallel repetition theorem for 1-of-2 puz-
zles (described earlier in the introduction). Parallel repetition (the idea of re-
peating a protocol polynomially many times to gain an exponential increase
in soundness) seems deceptively simple, while in truth it sometimes behaves
in unexpected ways, and such proofs are usually challenging (see [Raz11]
and references therein for the non-cryptographic setting); [BIN97] present
several cases where parallel repetition surprisingly does not grant an ex-
ponential reduction in error rate in cryptographic-settings. The parallel
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repetition theorem for 1-of-2 puzzles could be useful in other cryptographic
settings, as it builds on the TCF primitive to introduce a tool with an ex-
ponentially small error rate (rather than the constant error rate which is
guaranteed in the original work).
Prior Knowledge. Before we go any further, we discuss the accessibility
of this work. The reader is assumed to have a basic understanding of clas-
sical cryptography, and we follow the definitions and conventions of [Gol04]
and [KL14]. This work is aimed at readers who are familiar with quantum
computing, but such a background is not completely necessary. For further
reading, consult [NC11] for general quantum computing, and [BS16b] for
quantum cryptography. The two major “quantum” facts that are crucial
to understand for this paper are the following: (i) A qubit is the quantum
analog of a bit. Unlike bits, qubits cannot be copied due to the no-cloning
theorem. (ii) To extract classical information from qubits, a measurement
has to be preformed. The measurement changes the quantum state. Cru-
cially, this process is not reversible. This is in contrast to classical systems,
where rewinding is possible.
Structure. A structural overview of our paper is shown in Fig. 1.
In Section 2, we deal with NTCF and 1-of-2 puzzles. In Section 2.1, we
define a 1-of-2 puzzle. In Section 2.2, we show a construction of a 12 -hard
1-of-2 puzzle based on an NTCF. We conclude Section 2 by showing, in
Section 2.3, a method for constructing a strong 1-of-2 puzzle using repetition
of weak 1-of-2 puzzles.
In Section 3, we deal with our proposed semi-quantum money. Sec-
tion 3.1 contains the relevant definitions. In Section 3.2, we construct a
semi-quantum money mini-scheme and prove its security. In Section 3.3,
we present a full semi-quantum money scheme construction based on any
semi-quantum mini-scheme, and prove its security.
In Section 4 we combine the results of the preceding sections to prove
our main result, namely, Theorem 1.1.
Appendix A is a nomenclature, a “cheat sheet” describing some of our
notations. Appendix B contains mainly the standard definitions of private-
key encryption and message authentication code (MAC), and can be safely
skipped by readers who are familiar with these notions. Appendix C, taken
almost verbatim from Brakerski et al. [BCM+18], comprises a definition of
NTCF.
2 Trapdoor Claw-Free Families and 1-of-2 Puzzles
In this section, as the name suggests, we discuss the concepts of NTCF and
1-of-2 puzzles. For completeness, we restate the formal definition of NTCF
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Learning With Errors (LWE) assumption
NTCF
1
2 − hard 1-of-2 puzzle
strong 1-of-2 puzzle A PQ-EU-CMA (Definition 23) MAC
Semi-quantum money 2-of-2 mini-scheme
Semi-quantum money mini-scheme A PQ-IND-CPA (Definition 21) symmetric encryption
Semi-quantum money
Brakerski et al. [BCM+18], see also Theorem 26
Algorithm 1, Theorem 2
Construction in Definition 3, Corollary 10
Algorithm 3, Propositions 16, 15
Algorithm 3, Proposition 17
Algorithm 4, Propositions 19, 18
Figure 1: Structure of our construction. The right-hand side of the figure
shows our assumptions. The arrows point to constructions that make use of
these assumptions.
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by Brakerski et al. in Appendix C. In Section 2.1, we introduce 1-of-2
puzzles. In Section 2.2 we show how to construct a 1-of-2 puzzle using an
NTCF, and in Section 2.3 we show a parallel repetition theorem for 1-of-2
puzzles that is subsequently used to construct strong 1-of-2 puzzles.
2.1 1-of-2 Puzzles
Definition 1 (1-of-2 puzzle). A 1-of-2 puzzle consists of four efficient algo-
rithms: the puzzle generator G, an obligation algorithm O, a 1-of-2 solver S,
and a verification algorithm V . G is a classical algorithm, V is a classical
deterministic algorithm, and O and S are quantum algorithms.
1. G outputs, on security parameter 1λ, a random puzzle p and some
verification key v: (p, v)←$G(1λ).
2. O receives a puzzle p as input and outputs a classical string o called
the obligation and a quantum state ρ: (o, ρ)←$O(p).
3. S receives p, o, ρ and a bit b ∈ {0, 1} as input and outputs an answer
string a: a←$S(p, o, ρ, b).
4. V receives p, v, o, b, a as input and outputs 0 or 1: V (p, v, o, b, a) ∈
{0, 1}.
Completeness: Let η be some arbitrary function η : N 7→ [0, 1]. We say
that the 1-of-2 puzzle has completeness η if there exists a negligible function
negl(λ) such that
Pr[(p, v)←$G(1λ), (o, ρ)←$O(p), b←$ {0, 1}, a←$S(p, o, ρ, b) :
V (p, v, o, b, a) = 1]
≥ η(λ)− negl(λ) .
(2)
We define the V2 algorithm as:
V2(p, v, o, a0, a1) = V (p, v, o, 0, a0) · V (p, v, o, 1, a1) (3)
Hardness: Let h : N 7→ [0, 1] be an arbitrary function. We say that the
1-of-2 puzzle Z is 1− h hard if for any QPT 2-of-2 solver T there exists a
negligible function negl(λ) such that
Pr[SOLVE− 2T ,Z(λ) = 1] ≤ h(λ) + negl(λ) (4)
The 2-of-2 solving game SOLVE− 2T ,Z(λ):
1. The puzzle giver runs (p, v)←$G(1λ)
2. The 2-of-2 solver T receives input p and outputs a triple (o, ao, a1)
9
3. The puzzle giver runs r ← V2(p, v, o, a0, a1) and outputs r
4. T wins the game if and only if r = 1, in which case the output of the
game is defined to be 1.
We say that the 1-of-2 puzzle is strong if η = 1 and h = 0 (i.e., the
puzzle is 1-hard). We say that the 1-of-2 puzzle is weak if η = 1 and 1 − h
is noticeable.
2.2 An NTCF Implies a 1-of-2 Puzzle
This section presents how an NTCF can be used to construct a 1-of-2 puzzle.
The formal definition of an NTCF and its properties used in this section can
be found in the full version [?], as well as in Ref. [BCM+18].
Theorem 2. An NTCF implies a 1-of-2 puzzle with completeness η = 1
and hardness h = 12 .
Note that the 1-of-2 puzzle above is a weak 1-of-2 puzzle.
Proof. The proof contains arguments similar to those used by Brakerski et
al. [BCM+18].
Given an NTCF family F that consists of the algorithms
key-genF , InvF ,CHKF ,SAMPF , JF
we construct the 1-of-2 puzzle Z = (key-genZ , OZ , SZ , VZ) as specified in
Algorithm 1.
Completeness: we need to show that Eq. (2) holds for Z defined above.
By NTCF property 3, the state |ψ′〉 in line 2 of the algorithm OZ is negligibly
close in trace distance to:
|ψ˜〉 = 1√
2|X |
∑
x∈X ,y∈Y,b∈{0,1}
√
(f ′k,b(x))(y)|b, x〉|y〉
For the sake of the analysis, therefore, we can replace |ψ〉 with |ψ˜〉, and the
algorithm will behave the same, up to a negligible probability. By NTCF
property 2b, the post-measurement state |ψ〉 generated by OZ is |ψ〉 =
1√
2(|0〉|x0〉 + |1〉|x1〉), where (x0, x1) ∈ Rp. Since o was the outcome of
the measurement in line 3, we know that o ∈ Suppfp,i(xi). By NTCF
property 2a, for i ∈ {0, 1}:
xi = INVF (v, i, o) (5)
Consider the case b = 0. In this case, the output of SZ is a ≡ (i, xi),
where, by Eq. (5), xi = INVF (v, i, o). Therefore, VZ will return 1 in line 6.
In the case of b = 1, before line 6 in SZ the state is 1√2(|0〉|x0〉+|1〉|x1〉), after
10
Algorithm 1 The 1-of-2 Puzzle Z
1: procedure key-genZ(λ)
2: (k, tk)←$ key-genF (λ)
3: Set p ≡ k, v ≡ tk
4: return (p, v)
5: end procedure
1: procedure OZ(p)
2: |ψ′〉 ←$SAMPF (p, |+〉)
3: Measure the last register to obtain an o ∈ Y. Denote the post-
measurement state |ψ〉 . In the completeness we show that
|ψ〉 ≈ 1√2(|0〉|x0〉+ |1〉|x1〉).
4: return (o, |ψ〉)
5: end procedure
1: procedure SZ(p, o, |ψ〉, b) . p and o are not used in this construction.
2: if b = 0 then
3: Measure both registers of |ψ〉 to obtain a result i ∈ {0, 1} and
x ∈ X .
4: Set a ≡ (i, x)
5: else if b = 1 then
6: Evaluate the function J on the second register of |ψ〉, and apply
Hadamard transform on both registers.
7: Measure both registers to obtain the result i ∈ {0, 1} and d.
8: Set a ≡ (i, d)
9: end if
10: return a
11: end procedure
1: procedure VZ(p, v, o, b, a)
2: Set x0 ≡ INVF (v, 0, o) and x1 ≡ INVF (v, 1, o) . Recall that v is the
trapdoor, and o is an image of the NTCF.
3: if b = 0 then
4: Interpret a as i, x
5: if x = xi then
6: return 1
7: else
8: return 0
9: end if
10: else if b = 1 then
11: Interpret a as i, d.
12: if d ∈ Gp,0,x0 ∩Gp,1,x1 and d · (J(x0)⊕ J(x1)) = i then . This
membership test uses CHKF
13: return 1
14: else
15: return 0
16: end if
17: end if
18: end procedure 11
the evaluation of J on the second register the state is 1√2
∑
j∈{0,1} |j〉|J(xj)〉,
and after the Hadamard on both registers (which consist of w + 1 qubits),
the state is
1√
2w+2
∑
i∈{0,1},d∈{0,1}w
 ∑
j∈{0,1}
(−1)ij+d·J(xj)
 |i〉|d〉
= 1√
2w
∑
d∈{0,1}w
(−1)d·J(x0)|d · (J(x0)⊕ J(x1))〉|d〉
Therefore, the outcome of the measurement in line 7 will provide a random
d ∈ {0, 1}w and an i ∈ {0, 1} that satisfy i = d · (J(x0) ⊕ J(x1)). Since d
is random, property 4a guarantees that the first condition in line 12 of VZ
will be met (up to a negligible probability), and the analysis in the previous
sentence guarantees that the second condition will be met. Overall, the
probability that VZ outputs 1 is 1 − negl(λ), for some negligible function
negl, as required.
Soundness: We need to show that Eq. (4) holds for every QPT T . In
Algorithm 2, we show a reduction that maps a 2-of-2 solver T for the 1-of-2
puzzle as in Eq. (4) to an NTCF adversary A as in Eq. (9).
Algorithm 2 The Adversary A
1: procedure AF (k)
2: (o, a0, a1)←$ T (k)
3: Interpret a0 as i, x and a1 as i′, d.
4: return (i, x, d, i′)
5: end procedure
If T succeeds with probability 12 + (λ) (where (λ) is not necessar-
ily negligible), then the l.h.s. in Eq. (9) is lower-bounded by 2(λ) with
respect to A. Plugging the definition of V2 (see Eq. (3)) and the ac-
ceptance criteria of VZ into lines 6 and 12, we see that the 2-of-2 solver
T needs to find o, i, x, d, i′ such that d ∈ Gp,0,x0 ∩ Gp,1,x1 and x = xi,
where x0 = INVF (v, 0, o), x1 = INVF (v, 1, o) and i′ = d · (J(x0) ⊕ J(x1)).
This implies the membership of (i, x, d, i′) in Hk (see Eq. (8)). Therefore,
Pr(k,tk)←$ key-genF (1λ)[A(k) ∈ Hk] ≥ 12 + (λ). Since Hk and Hk are disjoint,
Pr(k,tk)←$ key-genF (1λ)[A(k) ∈ Hk] ≤ 12 − (λ), and∣∣∣ Pr
(k,tk)←key-genF (1λ)
[A(k) ∈ Hk]− Pr
(k,tk)←key-genF (1λ)
[A(k) ∈ Hk]
∣∣∣
≥ 2(λ) .
Since by property 2b (Definition 25) the l.h.s. of Eq. (9) is upper-
bounded by the negligible function µ(λ), we conclude that (λ) must be
negligible, as required for h = 12 .

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2.3 A Parallel Repetition Theorem for 1-of-2 Puzzles
Definition 3 (Repetition of 1-of-2 puzzle). Let Z be a 1-of-2 puzzle system,
and let n ∈ N. We denote by Gn the algorithm that, on security parameter λ,
runs G(1λ) for n(λ) times and outputs all the n puzzles with their verification
keys:
((p1, . . . , pn)), (v1, . . . , vn))←$Gn(1λ) (6)
where (pi, vi)←$G(1λ). A similar approach is used for all other algorithms
in Z:
((o1, . . . , on)), (ρ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ρn))←$On(p1, . . . , pn) (7)
where (oi, ρi)←$O(pi).
(a1, . . . , an)←$Sn((p1, . . . , pn), (o1, . . . , on), ρ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ρn, b)
where ai←$S(pi, oi, ρi, b). The algorithm
V n((p1, . . . , pn), (v1, . . . , vn), (o1, . . . , on), b, (a1, . . . , an))
outputs 1 iff for all i ∈ [n], V (pi, vi, oi, b, ai) = 1.
The n-fold repetition of Z is the 1-of-2 puzzle
Zn = (Gn, On, Sn, V n)
We emphasize that Zn is a 1-of-2 puzzle (and not a 1-of-2n puzzle),
which explains why the algorithm contains a single challenge bit b rather
than n bits. The reason for that should be made clear later – see Fact 8.
Theorem 4 (Parallel repetition of 1-of-2 puzzles). Let Z be a 1-of-2 puzzle
with completeness η and hardness parameter h. For a function n(λ) that
satisfies n(λ) = poly (λ), the 1-of-2 puzzle Zn has completeness ηn and
hardness parameter 1− hn.
Proof. First we prove the completeness property (see Eq. (2)). For ease of
notation, we write n, negl, η ,etc., instead of n(λ), negl(λ), η(λ). Suppose
that the success probability of Z is η − negl for some negligible function
negl. Since the repeated game Zn is an independent repetition of Z, its
success probability is (η − negl)n. We show that for the negligible function
negl′ = n2negl(λ), indeed (η − negl)n ≥ ηn − negl′:
(η − negl)n = ηn +
n∑
k=1
(−1)k
(
n
k
)
ηn−kneglk
≥ ηn −
n∑
k=1
nkneglk
≥ ηn −
n∑
k=1
n · negl = ηn − negl′,
13
where the last inequality holds for all λ ≥ λ0 (where n · negl ≤ 1).
We are now ready to prove the soundness. Our main tool is the notion
of a weakly verifiable puzzle system defined by Canetti, Halevi and Steiner:
Definition 5 (A weakly verifiable puzzle, adapted from [CHS05]). A system
for weakly verifiable puzzles consists of a pair of efficient classical algorithms
Zˆ = (G,V ) such that
1. The puzzle generator G outputs, on security parameter λ, a random
puzzle p along with some verification information v: (p, v)←$G(1λ).
2. The puzzle verifier V is a deterministic efficient classical algorithm
that, on input of a puzzle p, verification key v, and answer a, outputs
either zero or one: V (p, v, a) ∈ {0, 1}.
The hardness of a weakly verifiable puzzle is defined as follows:
Definition 6 (Hardness of a weakly verifiable puzzle, adapted from [CHS05]).
Let h : N 7→ [0, 1] be an arbitrary function. A weakly verifiable puzzle Zˆ is
said to be 1− h hard if, for any QPT3 algorithm S, there exists a negligible
function negl(λ) such that:
Pr[SOLVES,Zˆ(λ)] ≤ h(λ) + negl(λ)
The event SOLVES,Zˆ(λ) is defined by the following security game:
1. The puzzle giver runs (p, v)←$G(1λ)
2. The solver S is given input p and outputs an answer a
3. The puzzle giver runs r ← V (p, v, a). The event SOLVES,Zˆ(λ) is when
r = 1.
To avoid confusion, we always use Z to denote a 1-of-2 puzzle and Zˆ to
denote a weakly verifiable puzzle.
Definition 7 (Repetition of weakly verifiable puzzles, from [CHS05]). Let
Zˆ = (G,V ) be a weakly verifiable puzzle system, and let n : N 7→ N be some
function. We denote by Gn the algorithm that, on security parameter λ,
runs G(1λ) for n(λ) times and outputs all the n puzzles with their respective
verification keys:
((p1, . . . , pn)), (v1, . . . , vn))←$Gn(1λ)
3In [CHS05] this notion is defined for any PPT algorithm.
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where (pi, vi)←$Gn(1λ). V n receives n inputs and accepts if and only if all
n runs of V accept:
V n((p1, . . . , pn), (v1, . . . , vn), (a1, . . . , an)) ≡
n(λ)∏
i=1
V (pi, vi, ai)
There is a tight relation between the hardness of a 1-of-2 puzzle and
the hardness of a weakly verifiable puzzle. Given a 1-of-2 puzzle Z =
(G,O, S, V ), we define the weakly verifiable puzzle
Zˆ = (G,V2)
(where V2 is defined in Eq. (3)).
Fact 8. For every polynomially bounded function n : N 7→ N, the 1-of-2
puzzle Zn is 1 − h-hard if and only if the weakly verifiable puzzle Zˆn is
1− h-hard.
This fact follows from the observation that the hardness property of the
1-of-2 puzzle Z is equivalent to the hardness of the weakly verifiable puzzle
Zˆ (see Definitions 5 and 1). Furthermore, the hardness of Zn is equivalent
to the hardness of Zˆn (see Definitions 3 and 7).
Canetti, Halevi and Steiner proved a parallel repetition theorem for
weakly verifiable puzzles.
Theorem 9 ([CHS05]). Let  : N 7→ [0, 1] be an efficiently computable
function, let n : N 7→ N be efficiently computable and polynomially bounded,
and let Zˆ = (G,V ) be a weakly verifiable puzzle system. If Zˆ is 1− h-hard,
then Zˆn, the n-fold repetition of Zˆ, is 1− hn-hard.
Although the original proof of Canetti, Halevi and Steiner assumed that
the hardness is with respect to a classical solver, the proof uses a black-box
reduction that also holds with respect to quantum solvers, as defined in this
work.
We use Theorem 9 to prove the soundness of the 1-of-2 puzzle Zn. We
assume Z = (G,O, S, V ) is 1−h hard. We define the weakly verifiable puzzle
Zˆ = (G,V2). By the equivalence in Fact 8, we know that Zˆ is also 1 − h
hard. By Theorem 9, we know that Zˆn is 1−hn-hard. Using the equivalence
in Fact 8 again, we conclude that Zn is 1 − hn-hard, which completes the
proof. 
Corollary 10. A weak 1-of-2 puzzle implies a strong 1-of-2 puzzle.
Note that we define a weak 1-of-2 puzzle to have completeness η = 1. We
refrain from answering the question whether any puzzle in which η(λ)−h(λ)
is noticeable, implies a strong puzzle.
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Proof. By using Theorem 4 with n(λ) = log
2(λ)
log( 1
h
) repetitions
4 of the weak
h-hard 1-of-2 puzzle, we construct a 1-complete 5, 1 − hn = 1 − 1
λlog(λ)
=
1 − negl(λ)-hard 1-of-2 puzzle. Note that a 1 − negl(λ)-hard 1-of-2 puzzle
is equivalent to a 1-hard 1-of-2 puzzle, which completes the proof. 
3 Strong 1-of-2 Puzzles Imply Semi-QuantumMoney
In this section, we show a construction of a semi-quantum money scheme
using strong 1-of-2 puzzles.
In Section 3.1, we define interactive quantum money. We define three
degrees of security. Full scheme security means that every QPT counterfeiter
cannot pass t + 1 verifications given t quantum money states. We define
mini-scheme security as a weaker variant of full security, which is secure
only when the adversary is given a single banknote. Finally, we define 2-
of-2 mini-scheme security as an even weaker variant wherein the adversary
does not have a banknote verification oracle. We also formally define semi-
quantum money.
In Section 3.2, we show the construction of a 2-of-2 mini-scheme, and
show that our 2-of-2 mini-scheme is in fact a mini scheme (see Definition 14).
In Section 3.3, we show that any (interactive private quantum money)
mini scheme can be elevated to a full (interactive private quantum money)
scheme – see Definition 13.
3.1 Definitions of Semi-Quantum Money
Definition 11 (Interactive memoryless private quantum money). An in-
teractive memoryless private quantum money scheme consists of a classical
PPT key generation algorithm key-gen and two-party interactive memoryless
QPT protocols mint and verify. key-gen(1λ) outputs a key k. Both the mint-
ing protocol and the verification protocol are two-party quantum protocols
involving the Acquirer (a user), denoted A, and a Bank, denoted B. During
both protocols, the bank receives the key k as input, and the user does not.
At the end of the honest run of mint, the user holds a quantum money state
that, in general, could be a mixed state. In this work, the protocols will end
with a pure state, usually denoted |$〉. In the following sections, for the sake
of clarity, we work with the pure-state formalism. The banknote the user
chooses to verify is denoted in this work as the input of the verify protocol.
At the end of the verification protocol, the bank outputs a bit b that states
whether the money is valid or not.
4Note that n(λ) is indeed polynomial in λ - since a weak 1-of-2 puzzle holds that 1−h
is noticeable (see Definition 1), by using the inequality ln(1−ε) ≤ −ε we get that log(1/h)
is noticeable.
5Recall that a weak 1-of-2 puzzle has completeness η = 1 (see Definition 1).
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Correctness. The scheme is correct if there exists a negligible function
negl(λ) such that:
Pr(k←$ key-gen(1λ); |$〉 ←$mintk(1λ); b←$ verifyk(|$〉) :
b = 1) = 1− negl(λ)
Definition 12. We say that the protocol has classical minting (verification)
if B is classical in mint (verify). To emphasize that the verification is classi-
cal, we use cverify to denote the (calssical) verifiaction algorithm. We define
private semi-quantum money as any secure memoryless interactive private
quantum money protocol that has classical minting and classical verification.
In the quantum setting, there are a number of possible verifications with
different qualities; a notable quality is whether the verification “destroys”
the banknote (i.e., whether the banknote can be used again after verifica-
tion). This distinction can be thought of as the difference between verifying
– proving that a legal money state exists – and spending – proving a legal
money state doesn’t exist – and it becomes more interesting when consider-
ing the public setting; there, a banknote can be spent with the bank in the
same manner as in the private setting, but it can also be verified with other
users – in such a case it is important that the banknote is preserved, so it
could be transferred. Another distinction is added by the introduction of
classically verified money: whether the verification is a classical or quantum
protocol. Moreover, a classical verification must be a challenge-response pro-
tocol – otherwise the same proof can be passed twice, effectively spending
the same banknote twice. In our scheme, verification is classical and does
not preserve the banknote, proving both that it existed and that it does not
exist anymore.
In this definition, we emphasize that the protocols mint and verify are
memoryless: i.e., all outgoing messages depend solely on the key and the
input from the user. In other words, the bank does not maintain a variable
state that changes between different runs of the protocols – each run is
independent. Constructing a stateful scheme is trivial even in the classical
setting, as discussed in Appendix D. In addition, it is interesting to note that
our protocols are composed of a fixed number of messages, independent of
the security parameter: verify has 2 messages (a single round) and mint has
3 messages.
Definition 13. We say that an interactive private quantum money scheme
$ is secure if for every QPT counterfeiter A there exists a negligible function
negl(λ) such that:
Pr[COUNTERFEITfullA,$ (λ) = 1] ≤ negl(λ)
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The money counterfeiting game COUNTERFEITfullA,$ (λ):
1. The bank generates a key k←$ key-gen(1λ).
2. The bank and the counterfeiter interact. The counterfeiter can ask
the bank to run mintk(·) and verifyk(·) polynomially many times, in
any order the counterfeiter wishes. The counterfeiter is not bound to
following his side of the protocols honestly. The counterfeiter can keep
ancillary registers from earlier runs of these protocols and use them
in later steps. Let w be the number of successful verifications, ` the
number of times that mint was called by the counterfeiter and v the
number of times that verify was called by the counterfeiter.
3. The bank outputs (w, `, v).
The value of the game is 1 iff w > `. In this case we sometimes simply
say that the counterfeiter wins.
Following previous works [AC13, GK15], we define a private quantum
money mini-scheme, with a slight deviation. Additionally, we define a 2-of-2
mini-scheme, which is a weaker variant of the mini-scheme.
Definition 14 (quantum money mini-scheme and 2-of-2 mini-scheme). We
define mini-scheme security as we defined full scheme security but with re-
gard to COUNTERFEITminiB,$ (λ), wherein the counterfeiter B wins iff w >
` ∧ ` = 1.
We define 2-of-2 mini-scheme security as we did above but with regard
to COUNTERFEIT2−of−2C,$ (λ), where the counterfeiter C wins iff w > ` ∧ ` =
1 ∧ v = 2.
Note that the definitions in this sections could be naturally extended to
the public settings.
3.2 Construction of a Mini-Scheme
In this section, we show the construction of a scheme that we then prove to
be a 2-of-2 semi-quantum mini-scheme. Later we prove that our construction
in fact achieves a stronger security notion – a semi-quantum mini-scheme.
We now give an informal description of our construction, which is defined
formally in Algorithm 3. The construction uses a strong 1-of-2 puzzle and
a post-quantum existentially unforgeable under an adaptive chosen-message
attack (PQ-EU-CMA) MAC (see Definitions 1, 22 and 23). In key-gen, the
bank generates a MAC signing key and n pairs of strong 1-of-2 puzzles and
their respective verification keys. The minting process is done as follows.
The bank sends these n puzzles to the user, who then runs the obligation
protocol Z.O on all the n puzzles. The user keeps the quantum output
of O and sends the classical outputs (called the obligations) to the bank.
18
The bank signs these obligations using the classical MAC scheme and sends
these tags back to the user. The verification starts with the bank sending
random challenges to the user. The user then has to present a set of signed
obligations (which the user should have from the mint protocol) together
with a set of solutions to the challenges of these puzzles. The bank verifies
the solution to each puzzle with its respective verification key (the set of
verification keys is part of the key). Due to the fact that this verification is
classical, it is denoted cverify. We show that a counterfeiter cannot double-
spend a banknote without breaking the soundness of a strong 1-of-2 puzzle
(or the security of the MAC).
Intuitively, an adversary could try to double-spend the banknote using
the solutions he received from the first verification, while hoping to be given
the same challenges. However, assuming a sufficiently large number of puz-
zles (say, n = log2(λ)), the probability of encountering the exact same set
of challenges more than once is negligible. Passing two verifications of any
banknote in which the challenges were not the same both times essentially
requires one to pass the SOLVE− 2 security game for the 1-of-2 puzzle. In-
sofar as this is considered a strong 1-of-2 puzzle, the probability that it can
occur is therefore negligible.
For ease of notation, we write:
• pn := (p1, . . . , pn)
• vn := (v1, . . . , vn)
• on := (o1, . . . , on)
• ψn := |ψ1〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |ψn〉
• bn := (b1, . . . , bn)
• an := (a1, . . . , an)
Proposition 15 (Correctness of $Z). Assuming MAC has perfect complete-
ness and Z is a 1-of-2 puzzle with completeness η = 1, $Z (Algorithm 3)
is a semi-quantum money scheme that satisfies the correctness property (see
Definition 11).
Proof. Clearly, the communication and the bank’s operation in mint and
cverify are classical – therefore, the scheme is semi-quantum.
From the perfect completeness property of MAC (see Definition 22) we
get:
Pr[MAC.verifyk(on,MAC.mack(on)) = 1] = 1
meaning Pr[rMAC = 1] = 1.
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Algorithm 3 The Interactive Private Money Scheme $Z
$Z .key-gen(1λ)
1 : n← log2(λ)
2 : foreach i ∈ [n] :
3 : (pi, vi)← Z.G(1λ)
4 : pn ← (p1, . . . , pn), vn ← (v1, . . . , vn)
5 : k ←MAC.key-gen(1λ)
6 : k$ ← (pn, vn, k)
7 : return k$
$Z .mintk$
1 : Acquirer Bank
2 :
3 : p
n
4 : foreach i ∈ [n] :
5 : (oi, ψi)← Z.O(pi)
6 : on ← (o1, . . . , on), ψn ← (ψ1, . . . , ψn)
7 : o
n
8 : to ←MAC.mack(on)
9 : to
$Z .cverifyk$(o
n, to, ψ
n)
1 : Acquirer Bank
2 :
3 : b
n∈R{0, 1}n
4 : foreach i ∈ [n] :
5 : ai ← Z.S(pi, oi, |ψi〉, bi)
6 : a
n, on, to
7 : rMAC ←MAC.verifyk(on, to)
8 : foreach i ∈ [n] :
9 : ri ← Z.V (pi, vi, oi, bi, ai)
10 : r ← rMAC ·
n∏
i=1
ri
11 : return r
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From the completeness η = 1 of Z we get:
Pr[(p, v)←$Z.G(λ); (o, |ψ〉)←$Z.O(p); b←$ {0, 1};
a←$Z.S(p, o, |ψ〉, b) :
Z.v(p, v, o, b, a) = 1]
≥ 1− negl(λ)
Let bi be the event of failing verification on the ith puzzle. From the pre-
vious equation, Pr[bi] ≤ negl(λ) for some negligible function negl(λ). Let
negl′(λ) := n · negl(λ) = log2(λ) · negl(λ). Using the union bound:
Pr[∪ni=1bi] ≤
n∑
i=1
Pr[bi] = log2(λ) · negl(λ) = negl′(λ)
meaning Pr[(∏ni=1 ri) = 1] ≥ 1− negl′(λ). Thus:
Pr[k$←$ $Z .key-gen(1λ); (pn, on, to, ψn)←$ $Z .mintk$();
$Z .cverifyk$(p
n, on, to, ψ
n) = 1]
= Pr[rMAC = 1
⋂( n∏
i=1
ri
)
= 1]
≥1− negl′(λ)

Proposition 16 ($Z is a 2-of-2 mini-scheme). Assuming Z is a strong 1-
of-2 puzzle and MAC is a PQ-EU-CMA MAC, the scheme $Z (Algorithm
3) is a 2-of-2 mini-scheme (see Definition 14).
Proof. We show that the probability of a QPT counterfeiter to win the 2-
of-2 mini-scheme security game against $Z (Algorithm 3) is bound by the
negligible probability to solve both challenges of the strong 1-of-2 puzzle Z.
Intuitively, double-spending a banknote entails solving both challenges for
at least one of its n puzzles, which is intractable. For this proof, as well
as the following security proofs of our money scheme (Proposition 17 and
Theorem 19), we use a sequence-of-games based technique adapted from
[Sho04]. The following sequence of games binds the success probability of
any QPT 2-of-2 mini-scheme counterfeiter to that of a QPT 2-of-2 puzzle
solver (see Eq. (4)):
Game 0. Let C be a QPT 2-of-2 mini-scheme counterfeiter. We as-
sume w.l.o.g. that C performs exactly two verifications and one mint (i.e.,
` = 1 and v = 2) – an adversary which does not comply with this as-
sumption will necessarily fail (see Definition 14). We define Game 0 to be
COUNTERFEIT2−of−2C,$Z (λ).
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Let S0 be the event where w > 1 (see Definition 14) in Game 0 (this is
the original win condition for C, since we assume ` = 1 ∧ v = 2).
Game 1. We now transform Game 0 into Game 1, simply by changing the
win condition: game 1 is identical to game 0, but we define the following
event: let b1n, b2n be the random bit strings that were generated in line 3
of $Z .cverify the first and second times C asked for verification, respectively.
Let S1 be the event where w > 1 ∧ b1n 6= b2n in Game 1.
Let F be the event where b1n = b2n in Game 1, and F ′ the event where
w > 1 ∧ b1 = b2 in Game 1. Since b1n and b2n are generated uniformly and
independently, Pr[F ] = 12n ≤ negl(λ) for some negligible function negl(λ).
Therefore: Pr[S0] = Pr[S1 ∪ F ′] ≤ Pr[S1 ∪ F ] ≤ Pr[S1] + Pr[F ] ≤ Pr[S1] +
negl(λ). So Pr[S0] ≤ Pr[S1] + negl(λ).
Game 2. We now add a small change to the game above: at the start of
the game, a uniform i′ ∈R [n] is chosen by the bank. Let j be the first index
such that b1j 6= b2j (j =∞ if b1 = b2).
Let S2 be the event where w > 1 ∧ b1 6= b2 ∧ i′ = j in Game 2.
S1 ⇒ b1 6= b2, so since i′ was chosen uniformly and independently of w,
b1, b2 and j, we get that Pr[S2|S1] = 1n . Moreover, it is easy to see that
Pr[S2|¬S1] = 0. So Pr[S2] = 1n · Pr[S1], meaning Pr[S1] is a polynomial
multiplicative factor of Pr[S2].
Game 3. Game 3 is identical to Game 2, but we now add an additional
constraint to the win condition. Let on be the set of obligations C sent in line
7 of $Z .mint, and let o1
n, o2n be the sets of obligations sent by C during line
6 of $Z .cverify the first and second times C asks for verification, respectively.
Let S3 be the event where w > 1 ∧ b1 6= b2 ∧ i′ = j ∧ o1n = o2n = on in
Game 3.
Let F be the event where C passes one or more verifications such that
o1
n 6= on or o2n 6= on. It is easy to see that S2 ∧ ¬F ⇐⇒ S3 ∧ ¬F .
Therefore, from the Difference Lemma (Lemma 24) we get
|Pr[S3]− Pr[S2]| ≤ Pr[F ]
From the unforgeability of MAC (see Definition 23), Pr[F ] is negligible6.
Therefore, Pr[S2] ≤ Pr[S3] + negl(λ).
6Otherwise, we could construct a MAC forger F with non-negligible success probability.
Assume towards a contradiction that with non-negligible probability, C passes verification
by sending in line 6 o′n, t′o such that o′
n 6= on. That means that the MAC verification in
line 7 passed. So F could simulate a bank, but instead of signing and verifying with k
generated in $Z .key-gen, F uses the signing and verification oracles. F runs C against the
simulated bank, and present o′n, o˜′n. With non-negligible probability, MAC verification
passes, and since o′n 6= on, and no other signings are requested (mint was run only once),
F wins MAC− FORGEF,MAC(λ).
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Game 4. We now change the behavior of verifications. Let a1n, a2n be the
sets of answers sent by C in line 6 of $Z .cverify the first and second times C
asks for verification, respectively7. Instead of performing verifications both
times, the bank now performs both verifications only on the second time:
the first time $Z .cverify is called, after line 6 the bank returns 1 and stops.
The second time $Z .cverify is called, the bank performs both verifications:
i.e., on the second verification we replace everything from line 9 with:
8 : foreach i ∈ [n] :
9 : ri ← Z.V (pi, vi, oi, b1i , a1i )
10 : r′i ← Z.V (pi, vi, oi, b2i , a2i )
11 : endforeach
12 : r ← rMAC ·
n∏
i=1
ri ·r′i
13 : return r
Let S4 be the event where w > 1 ∧ b1 6= b2 ∧ i′ = j ∧ o1n = o2n = on in
Game 4.
Verifying both inputs on the second request is equivalent to verifying
them individually: S3 ⇒ S4 since if both verifications pass in Game 3, then
both pass in Game 4 (the first one always passes, the second one runs both
verifications that passed in S3), and ¬S3 ⇒ ¬S4 since that means one of the
verifications in Game 3 fail, which means the second verification in Game 4
fails. So Pr[S3] = Pr[S4].
Game 5. We now change the second verification: on the i′th pair of puz-
zles, if b1i′ 6= b2i′ (we note that this always holds when i′ = j), we perform
V2 instead of normal verification – i.e., we replace everything from line 9
forward in $Z .cverify in the second verification with:
7C can, of course, run both verification protocols simultaneously. We number the
verifications according to the one that got to line 6 of the protocol first.
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8 : foreach i ∈ [n] :
9 : if i = i′ ∧ b1i′ 6= b2i′ :
10 : if b1i = 0 : aˆ0 ← a1i , aˆ1 ← a2i
11 : else : aˆ0 ← a2i , aˆ1 ← a1i
12 : ri, r′i ← V2(pi, vi, oi, aˆ0, aˆ1)
13 : else :
14 : ri ← Z.V (pi, vi, oi, b1i , a1i )
15 : r′i ← Z.V (pi, vi, oi, b2i , a2i )
16 : endif
17 : endforeach
18 : r ← rMAC ·
n∏
i=1
ri · r′i
19 : return r
Let S5 be the event where w > 1 ∧ b1 6= b2 ∧ i′ = j ∧ o1n = o2n =
on ∧ V2(pi, vi, oi, aˆ0, aˆ1) = 1 in Game 5.
In the case where i = i′∧b1i = b2i , running V2(pi, vi, oi, aˆ0, aˆ1) is equivalent
to running Z.v twice, since we assign aˆ0 and aˆ1 respective to b1i and b2i . So
S4 ⇐⇒ S5, meaning Pr[S4] = Pr[S5].
Game 6. We now simply relax the win condition: Game 6 goes exactly
the same as Game 5, but we define the following event: let S6 be the event
where V2(pi, vi, oi, aˆ0, aˆ1) = 1 in Game 6. Since this is a relaxation of the
conditions of S5, we get Pr[S5] ≤ Pr[S6].
Bound on success probability. We show a reduction mapping a 2-of-2
mini-scheme counterfeiter to a 2-of-2 solver (see Definition 6):
Let C be a QPT 2-of-2 mini-scheme counterfeiter. We construct a QPT
2-of-2 solver T in the following manner:
Let (p, v) be the output of G(1λ) at step 1 of the solving game. On step
2, T simulates a Game 6 bank (by honestly running mints and verifications
as defined in game 5, as well as choosing i′ uniformly) with two changes:
1. The i′th puzzle is replaced with p.
2. In line 12 of the second verification, T outputs (oi, aˆ0, aˆ1) to the
puzzle giver instead of running V2. The honest puzzle giver runs
V2(p, v, oi, aˆ0, aˆ1) and returns the result, which T uses as ri and ri′ .
We can see that for any C, Pr[S6] is not affected by the above changes: in
the first change we replace a random puzzle with another random puzzle,
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which has no affect on Pr[S6]. In the second change, the honest puzzle giver
runs V2 with exactly the same input as the bank in the original Game 6
should, and returns the result – this also does not affect Pr[S6].
T runs C against Game 6. S6 is exactly the win condition of the 2-of-2
solving game, which means T wins the 2-of-2 solving game with probability
Pr[S6]. Since Z is a strong 1-of-2 puzzle, the success probability of any
QPT 2-of-2 solver is negligible – meaning Pr[S6] is negligible for any QPT
counterfeiter.
For each pair of consecutive games i and i + 1, we have shown that
Pr[Si] ≤ poly(λ) · Pr[Si+1] + negl(λ) for some poly(λ) , negl(λ). Finally, we
have shown that Pr[S6] is negligible in λ, so we can conclude that Pr[S0] is
negligible in λ. Since Game 0 is defined as the 2-of-2 mini-scheme counter-
feiting game, and S0 is defined as its win condition, no QPT 2-of-2 mini-
scheme counterfeiter can win the game with more than negligible probabil-
ity. 
We now prove that $Z (Algorithm 3) is, in fact, a mini-scheme (see
Definition 14). Unlike the others, this proof is not modular – not every 2-of-
2 mini-scheme is a mini-scheme. For example, consider a scheme wherein the
bank shares with the counterfeiter a single bit of the key on each verification.
This scheme could have 2-of-2 mini-scheme security, but obviously, it would
not be secure for a counterfeiter with a verification oracle, which could easily
discern the key.
Proposition 17 ($Z is a mini-scheme). Assuming $Z is a 2-of-2 mini-
scheme (where $Z is given in Algorithm 3, and a 2-of-2 mini-scheme is
defined in Definition 14), $Z is a mini-scheme (see Definition 14).
Proof. We use an idea very similar to that used in [PYJ+12, Theorm 5]
(a slightly different variation also appeared in [BS16a, Appendix C]); we
show that if a counterfeiter with access to a verification oracle can ask for
v verifications and have two of them succeed, a 2-of-2 counterfeiter could
guess the two success indices randomly and apply the same strategy, thus
breaking the security of the 2-of-2 mini-scheme. The following sequence of
games binds the success probability of any QPT mini-scheme counterfeiter
to that of a QPT 2-of-2 mini-scheme counterfeiter against $Z :
Game 0. Let B be a QPT mini-scheme counterfeiter. We assume w.l.o.g.
that B asks for mint only once (i.e., ` = 1), and for verification v times such
that v is polynomial in λ – an adversary which does not comply with this
assumption necessarily fails (see Definition 14). We define the first game to
be COUNTERFEITminiB,$Z (λ) (see Definition 14).
Let S0 be the event where w > 1 (see Definition 14) in Game 0 (this is
the original win condition for B since we assume ` = 1 and v is polynomial
in λ).
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Game 1. We now make one small change to Game 0, namely, that the
game stops after B receives two successful verifications (i.e., the counterfeiter
is not allowed to make additional verifications after receiving two successful
ones. We model this by defining additional verification attempts as failures).
Let S1 be the event where w = 2 in Game 1.
It is obvious why S1 ⇒ S0. In addition, S0 ⇒ S1, since any run of Game
0 with more than two successful verifications is equivalent to a run of Game
1 in which all verifications beyond the second successful one are ignored. So
Pr[S0] = Pr[S1].
Game 2. We model a run of v verifications using a string r ∈ {0, 1}v,
such that ri = 1 if and only if the ith time B asked for verification was
successful8. At the beginning of Game 2, a uniform binary string r′ ∈R
{0, 1}v is generated such that ∑vi=1 r′i = 2.
Let S2 be the event where w = 2 ∧ r′ = r in Game 2.
Given S1, we know that the string r representing the verifications in
Game 1, like r′, also holds ∑vi=1 ri = 2. There are (v2) such strings, so since
r′ was chosen uniformly and independently of r, there is a 1(v2)
probability
that r′ = r. So Pr[S2] = 1(v2)
· Pr[S1], meaning Pr[S1] =
(v
2
) · Pr[S2].
Game 3. We transform Game 2 into Game 3 by changing the following:
for each i ∈ [v], for the ith time B runs a verification protocol with the bank,
instead of receiving the actual result of the MAC and puzzle verifications
(r), it receives r′i; i.e., we change line 11 with return r′i.
Let S3 be the event where w = 2 ∧ r′ = r in Game 3.
Given S2, since r′ = r in both Game 2 and Game 3, the fact that
B receives r′i instead of ri changes nothing. So Pr[S3|S2] = 1. Trivially,
Pr[S3|¬S2] = 0. So Pr[S2] = Pr[S3].
Game 4. Let k, h be the two indices such that r′k = r′h = 1, k 6= h (by
construction there are exactly two such indices). In Game 4, for every
verification other than the kth and the hth, the MAC verification and puzzle
verifications are not called at all – bi is generated and r′i is returned; i.e.,
lines 7 to 10 are removed.
Let S4 be the event where w = 2 ∧ r′ = r in Game 4.
It is easy to see that Pr[S3] = Pr[S4], since for every verification but the
kth and the hth, the bank did nothing with the result of the MAC or puzzle
verifications, so whether we run them at all changes nothing.
8B can, of course, run several verification protocols simultaneously. We number the
verifications according to the order in which they were initiated.
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Bound on success probability. We show a reduction mapping a mini-
scheme counterfeiter to a 2-of-2 mini-scheme counterfeiter (see Definition 14):
Let B be a QPT mini-scheme counterfeiter. We construct a a QPT 2-of-2
mini-scheme counterfeiter C in the following manner:
C simulates a Game 4 bank with the following difference: when asked
to run $Z .mint, it, in turn, asks the real bank to run $Z .mint and returns
the result, and on the kth an hth verifications, it asks the real bank to run
$Z .cverify and returns the result. We note that for any other verification, C
can simulate the bank since MAC and puzzle verifications are not performed;
all it needs to do is choose a uniform b and return r′i. C runs B against the
simulated Game 4 bank.
So Pr[S4] = Pr[COUNTERFEIT2−of−2C,$Z (λ) = 1] ≤ negl(λ) for some neg-
ligible function negl(λ). Therefore, by construction, we get that Pr[S0] ≤
poly(λ)·Pr[S4] for some poly(λ) and therefore is also negligible for any QPT
counterfeiter. Game 0 is defined as the original mini-scheme security game,
and S0 is defined as its original win condition; therefore, $Z (Algorithm 3)
is a mini-scheme. 
3.3 A Mini-Scheme Implies a Full Blown Scheme
We show how a mini-scheme $ can be used to construct a full blown scheme
$ˆ. The construction is based on a very similar idea to those in [BS16a,
Appendix C] and [AC13, Section 3.3].
Here we provide an informal description of our full scheme $ˆ. The con-
struction is defined formally in Algorithm 4. Our full scheme is constructed
by minting mini-scheme banknotes, and including the key of the mini-scheme
in each one. To that end, a MAC and a private-key encryption scheme are
used: on minting, the bank mints a mini-scheme banknote, encrypts the
mini-scheme key that was generated in the process, signs it in its encrypted
form, and hands it to the user together with the mini-scheme banknote. The
secure nature of the encryption scheme prevents the user from exploiting the
mini-scheme key to break the mini-scheme’s underlying security. On verifi-
cation, the bank uses the MAC scheme to verify that the note was indeed
minted by a bank, after which it decrypts the mini-scheme key to verify the
mini-scheme banknote itself.
In both [BS16a] and [AC13], the core idea of the construction is the same,
with minor differences: in [BS16a] algorithms are used instead of interactive
protocols, and [AC13] is in the public setting, so a digital signature scheme
is used instead of MAC, and an encryption scheme is not nescessary.
We prove the security of the full-blown scheme by showing a reduction
mapping a full-blown scheme counterfeiter to a mini-scheme counterfeiter,
such that the mini-scheme counterfeiter generates fake bank notes for the
full-blown counterfeiter.
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Algorithm 4 The Interactive Private Money Scheme $ˆ
$ˆ.key-gen(1λ)
1 : km ←MAC.key-gen
2 : ke ← ENC.key-gen
3 : return (km, ke)
$ˆ.mint(km,ke)
1 : Acquirer Bank
2 :
3 : k$ ← $.key-gen(1λ)
4 : c← ENC.encryptke(k$)
5 : t←MAC.mackm(c)
|$〉 ← $.mintk$()
6 :
7 : c, t
$ˆ.cverify(km,ke)(c, t, |$〉)
1 : Acquirer Bank
2 :
3 : c, t
4 : rm ←MAC.verifykm(c, t)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . if rm = 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5 :
6 : k$ ← ENC.decryptke(c)
rv ← $.cverifyk$(|$〉)
7 :
8 : return rv
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . if rm = 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
9 : return 0
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Proposition 18 (Correctness of $ˆ). Assuming $ is a correct mini-scheme
(see Definition 11) and that both MAC and ENC have perfect completeness,
$ˆ (Algorithm 4) is correct (see Definition 11).
Proof. From the perfect completeness of MAC (see Definition 22), we get
that Pr[Sm] = 1, where
Sm := MAC.verifykm(c,MAC.mackm(c)) = 1
Therefore, when the acquirer is honest, we know that he will send t =
MAC.signkm(c) (that he received during the run of $ˆ.mint) to the bank on
line 3 of $ˆ.cverify. Thus, the MAC verification on line 4 will succeed.
From the perfect completeness of ENC (see Definition 20), we get that
Pr[Se] = 1, where
Se := ENC.decryptke(ENC.encryptke(k$)) = k$
Therefore, when the acquirer is honest, we know that he will send c =
ENC.encryptke(k$) (that he received during the run of $ˆ.mint) to the bank
on line 3 of $ˆ.cverify. Thus, the decryption in line 6 will succeed.
From the above, we conclude that for an honest acquirer both the de-
cryption and MAC verification in $ˆ.cverify always succeeds. As such, the
verification can only fail in $.cverifyk$ . We know that the result of the de-
cryption is k$ as it was generated in $ˆ.mint, and that this k$ was generated
by running $.key-gen. Thus, from the correctness of the mini-scheme $ (see
Definition 11), we get that Pr[S$] ≥ 1−negl(λ) for some negligible function
negl(λ), where
S$ := k$←$ $.key-gen(1λ); |$〉 ←$ $.mintk$();
$.cverifyk$(|$〉) = 1
$ˆ.cverify passes whenMAC.verify, ENC.decrypt and $.cverify all pass, so for
an honest acquirer:
Pr[(km, ke)←$ $ˆ.key-gen(1λ); (c, t, |$ˆ〉)←$ $ˆ.mint(km,ke)();
$ˆ.cverify(km,ke)(c, t, |$ˆ〉) = 1]
= 1− Pr[¬Sm ∪ ¬Se ∪ ¬S$]
≥ 1− negl(λ)

Theorem 19 ($ˆ is a secure interactive private quantum money scheme).
Assuming $ is an interactive private quantum money mini-scheme, MAC
is a PQ-EU-CMA MAC (see Definition 23) and ENC has PQ-IND-CPA
(see Definition 21), $ˆ (Algorithm 4) is a secure interactive private quantum
money scheme (see Definition 13). Moreover, if $ is semi-quantum, $ˆ is
also semi-quantum.
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Proof. The proof idea is very similar to that used in [BS16a, Appendix C]
– we show that the success probability of any full-scheme counterfeiter able
to verify more banknotes than he received is upper-bounded by the suc-
cess probability of a mini-scheme counterfeiter; a mini-scheme counterfeiter
could guess which banknote the full-scheme counterfeiter will double-spend,
generate fake banknotes, and with non-negligible probability double-spend
the single mini-scheme banknote. The following sequence of games binds
the success probability of any QPT full-scheme counterfeiter to that of a
QPT mini-scheme counterfeiter:
Game 0. Let A be a QPT full scheme counterfeiter. We assume that the
amount of mints and verifications requested by A is polynomial in λ (i.e.,
` and v are polynomial in λ) – an adversary which does not comply with
this assumption is not QPT. We define the first game to be the original
interactive private quantum money security game, COUNTERFEITfullA,$ˆ (λ)
(see Definition 13).
Let S0 be the event where w > ` (see Definition 13) in Game 0 (this is
the original win condition of the interactive private quantum money security
game, since we assume ` and v are polynomial in λ).
Game 1. We change Game 0 slightly by adding the condition that a spe-
cific banknote is double-spent: Recall that ` and v are the numbers of times
$ˆ.mint and $ˆ.cverify are run during Game 0, respectively. In the start of
Game 1 a uniform i ∈R [`] is chosen by the bank. Let (cj , tj , |$j〉) be the
result of the jth mint, and let wj be the amount of verifications such that
$ˆ.cverify(cj , t, |$〉) = 1 for some t, |$〉. Let jˆ be the smallest j such that
wj ≥ 2 (jˆ =∞ if for all j ∈ [`] : wj < 2).
Let S1 be the event where w > ` ∧ i = jˆ in Game 1.
Assume S0 occurred. Due to the unforgeability of MAC (see Defini-
tion 23), we know that in every successful verification, A presented (cj , t, |$〉)
for some j ∈ [`], t, |$〉9. Therefore, since A was given only ` pairs (cj , tj)
(from the ` times that $ˆ.mint was run), and there were w > ` successful ver-
ifications from the assumption that S0 occurred, then from the pigeonhole
principle we conclude that wj ≥ 2 for some j, meaning 1 ≤ jˆ ≤ `. Since
i ∈ [`] was chosen randomly and independently to jˆ, given S0, there is a
1
` probability that i = jˆ; in which case S1 occurs – therefore Pr[S1|S0] =1
` · Pr[S0].
9Suppose A passes with non-negligible probability a verification of (c, t, |$〉) such that
c 6= cj ∀j ∈ [`]. In that case MAC.verify(c, t) = 1 with non-negligible probability. We
could use A to construct a forger F with non-negligible success probability: F simulates
a bank, but instead of signing and verifying with the MAC key generated in $ˆ.key-gen, he
uses the signing and verification oracles. He then runs A against the simulated bank, and
will be able to present c, t which pass MAC verification with non-negligible probability,
while he did not ask for a tag of c before since c 6= cj ∀j ∈ [`].
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Assume S0 did not occur: then we know w ≤ `, meaning S1 also did not
occur – namely, Pr[S1|¬S0] = 0. So Pr[S1] = 1` · Pr[S0], meaning Pr[S0] is
Pr[S1] times some polynomial in λ.
Game 2. We now change the above game such that now, on the ith mint10,
instead of encrypting and signing the mini-scheme key from line 3 (the one
later used in $.mint), the bank encrypts and signs 0$ (where 0$ is a string
of 0’s the length of a mini-scheme key); i.e., on the ith mint we replace lines
4 and 5 with:
c← ENC.encryptke(0$)
t←MAC.mackm(c)
On $ˆ.cverify(c, t, |$〉), if ENC.decryptke(c) = 0$, then the bank runs $.cverify
with the original mini-scheme key that was used in the ith mint (the one
originally generated in line 3 of the ith mint) rather than with 0$.
Let S2 be the event where w > ` ∧ i = jˆ in Game 2.
Game 2 is different from Game 1 only in the ith mint, and the sole
difference in the ith mint is that A receives an encrypted and signed 0$
rather than the key that was used in $.mint. Similarly, in a verification for
(c, t, |$〉) such that c = ENC.encryptke(0$) for some t, |$〉, the mini-scheme
bank verifies |$〉 with the mini-scheme key that was generated in the ith
mint, that in Game 1 is sent instead of 0$.
That means that the only difference between Game 2 and Game 1 is
in what A receives on the ith mint; on the ith mint, A receives a signed
encryption of a random key rather than the key used to sign the mini-scheme
banknote he received, but the same key will be used to verify it, just like on
a normal verification. So, due to the indistinguishability of ENC, replacing
an encryption of one message with the encryption of another message of the
same length11 cannot change the behavior of A, i.e., |Pr[S2] − Pr[S1]| ≤
negl(λ)12.
10A can, of course, run several mint protocols simultaneously. We number them accord-
ing to the order they were initiated.
11Indistiguishability works for messages of the same length. Here we assume, without
loss of generality, that key-gen(1λ) always outputs keys of the same length.
12Assume |Pr[S2]− Pr[S1]| is non-negligible. Assume without loss of generality that
Pr[S2] ≤ Pr[S1]. In that case, we could construct a distinguisher D with non-negligible
success probability: D will simulate a bank, but instead of encrypting with the ENC key
generated in $ˆ.key-gen, he will use the encryption oracle, and instead of decrypting he
will “remember” each encryption he made and thus could match each encryption to the
relevant key (any unrecognized encryption would not have passed the real bank verification
either, because the encryptions are MAC signed). On the ith mint, he will present a
random key and the actual mini-scheme key used in that mint as m0 and m1 (the chosen
messages whose encryptions he needs to recognize in the CPA game) respectively, and
proceed with the encryption he received to finish the game. D returns b′ = 1 (guessing
the encryption he received was of the real key) if and only if he wins the counterfeiting
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Bound on success probability. We show a reduction mapping a Game
2 counterfeiter to a mini-scheme counterfeiter:
Let A be a QPT full-scheme counterfeiter. We construct a mini-scheme
counterfeiter B in the following manner:
B simulates the bank of Game 2, with one exception: on the ith mint,
instead of generating the actual mini-scheme key and banknote, B asks the
actual mini-scheme bank to run $.mint. Similarly, when performing a verifi-
cation for 0ˆ$, B asks the actual mini-scheme bank for verification. B runs A
against the altered version of Game 2. The only difference from the original
Game 2 is that on the ith mint B asks the bank to generate the banknote,
and when he receives 0$ he asks the bank to verify that same note. The
honest mini-scheme bank runs minting and verification on that banknote
in the exact same way as the bank in Game 2 should, meaning that Pr[S2]
is unchanged for any A by the simulated Game 2. In the case that S2 oc-
curred, B passed at least two verifications with 0$, meaning he passed two
verifications with the actual bank, while only asking mint once. So B has a
probability of Pr[S2] to pass win the mini-scheme counterfeiting game, and
we showed that the success probability of any QPT counterfeiter to do so is
negligible – meaning Pr[S2] must be negligible.
From construction, Pr[S0] is also negligible. Game 0 was defined to
be the original full-scheme security game, and S0 was defined as its win
condition; so $ˆ is secure (see Definition 13). 
4 Putting It All Together
For convenience, we restate the main theorem:
Theorem 1.1 (Main Theorem). Assuming that the Learning With Errors
(LWE) problem with certain parameters is hard for BQP and that a post-
quantum existentially unforgeable under an adaptive chosen message attack
MAC (Definition 23) and an encryption scheme with post-quantum indis-
tinguishability under adaptive chosen plaintext attack (Definition 21) exist,
then a secure semi-quantum private money scheme exists (Definition 12).
Proof. From Theorem 26 we get that the hardness of LWE implies that an
NTCF family exists. From Theorem 2 we get that an NTCF implies 12 -hard
1-of-2 puzzles, and from Corollary 10 we get that weak 1-of-2 puzzles (and
in particular, 12 -hard 1-of-2 puzzles) imply strong 1-of-2 puzzles.
By combining Propositions 15, 16, 17 and 18 and Theorem 19 (based on
the constructions of Algorithm 3 and Algorithm 4), we get that — assuming
a PQ-EU-CMA MAC and a PQ-IND-CPA private-key encryption scheme
exist — strong 1-of-2 puzzles imply secure semi-quantum private money. 
game (since he wins with higher probability when he receives encryption of the real key).
D has a 12 + |Pr[S2]−Pr[S1]|2 probability to win, which is non-negligible, in contradiction to
the security of ENC.
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5 Discussion
The main question that is raised in this work is the following. There are
many multi-party quantum cryptographic protocols which require that both
parties have quantum resources. This work elicits an important question: is
there a way (preferably, as general as possible) to convert some of these pro-
tocols to ones in which at least one of the parties does not need a quantum
computer? A weaker open question can be posed from the perspective of
device-independent cryptography: can at least one party use an untrusted
quantum computer in unison with a trusted classical computer? We empha-
size that device independent protocols (see [VV19, FRV19] and references
therein), such as DI quantum key distribution, DI randomness expansion13
and randomness amplification, use unconditional (information theoretic) se-
curity notions, while our protocols are only computationally secure.
It is known that public quantum money schemes cannot be secure against
computationally unbounded adversaries [AC13], and hence, computational
assumptions are necessary for any public scheme. Are computational as-
sumptions also necessary for semi-quantum private money? To the best of
our knowledge, a similar question holds for the classical verification of quan-
tum computation, where the only known way to tackle this problem while
using a single server uses computational assumptions [Mah18b], but it is not
clear whether a computational assumption is necessary.
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Z A 1-of-2 puzzle, page 10
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chosen-message attack, page 37
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B Preliminaries
This appendix contains mainly the standard definitions of private-key en-
cryption and message authentication codes (MAC), and can be safely skipped
by readers already familiar with these notions.
We use the standard definitions for negligible, non-negligible and notice-
able functions – see, e.g., [Gol01].
Definition 20 (Private-key encryption system, [KL14, Definition 3.7]). A
private-key encryption scheme consists of three PPT algorithms key-gen,
encrypt and decrypt such that:
1. The randomized key-generation algorithm key-gen takes as input 1λ
and outputs a key k ← key-gen(1λ).
2. The (possibly randomized) encryption algorithm encrypt takes as input
a key k and a plaintext message m ∈ {0, 1}∗, and outputs a ciphertext
c← encryptk(m).
3. The deterministic decryption algorithm decrypt takes as input a key k
and a ciphertext c, and outputs a message m := Deck(c).
A private-key encryption system is required to have perfect completeness,
meaning that for every λ, every k output by key-gen(1λ), and every m ∈
{0, 1}∗, it holds that decryptk(encryptk(m)) = m.
Definition 21 (PQ-IND-CPA, adapted from [KL14, Definition 3.22]). A
private-key encryption scheme Π has post-quantum indistinguishable en-
cryptions under a chosen-plaintext attack (PQ-IND-CPA) if for every QPT
distinguisher D there is a negligible function negl(λ) such that, for all λ:
Pr[IND-CPAD,Π(λ) = 1] ≤ 12 + negl(λ)
The indistinguishability game IND-CPAD,Π(λ):
1. A key k is generated by running key-gen(1λ).
2. The distinguisher D is given input 1λ and classical oracle access to
encryptk(·), and outputs a pair of messages m0,m1 of the same length.
3. A uniform bit b ∈R {0, 1} is chosen, and then a ciphertext c ←
encryptk(mb) is computed and given to D.
4. D continues to have oracle access to encryptk(·) and outputs a bit b′.
5. The output of the game is defined to be 1 if b′ = b, and 0 otherwise.
In the former case, we say that D succeeds.
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Definition 22 (Message authentication code [KL14, Definition 4.1]). A
message authentication code (MAC) consists of 3 PPT algorithms key-gen, mac
and verify satisfying:
1. key-gen takes as input the security parameter 1λ and outputs a key k
2. mac takes as input a key k and a message m ∈ {0, 1}∗ and outputs a
tag t← mack(m).
3. verify takes as input a key k, a message m, and a tag t. It outputs a
bit b := verifyk(m, t), with b = 1 meaning valid and b = 0 meaning
invalid.
A MAC is required to have perfect completeness, i.e., for every λ, every key
k ← key-gen(1λ) and every m ∈ {0, 1}∗, it holds that verifyk(m,mack(m)) =
1.
Definition 23 (PQ-EU-CMA, adapted from [KL14, Definition 4.2]). A
message authentication code Π is Post-Quantum Existentially Unforgeable
under an adaptive Chosen-Message Attack (PQ-EU-CMA) if for every QPT
forger F , there exists a negligible function negl(λ) such that:
Pr[MAC− FORGEF ,Π(λ) = 1] ≤ negl(λ)
The CMA message authentication game MAC− FORGEF ,Π(λ):
1. A key k is generated by running key-gen(1λ).
2. The forger F is given input 1λ, classical oracle access to mack(·) and
classical oracle access to verifyk(·) (note that the forger cannot query
the oracles in superposition). The forger eventually outputs (m, t).
Let Q denote the set of all queries that F asked its signing oracle.
3. F succeeds if and only if (1) verifyk(m, t) = 1 and (2) m /∈ Q. In that
case the output of the game is defined to be 1.
Lemma 24 (Difference Lemma [Sho04, Lemma 1]). Let A,B, F be events
defined in some probability distribution, and suppose that A ∧ ¬F ⇐⇒
B ∧ ¬F . Then |Pr[A]− Pr[B]| ≤ Pr[F ].
C Trapdoor Claw-Free Families
Most of this section is taken verbatim from Brakerski et al. [BCM+18]. Let
λ be a security parameter, and let X and Y be finite sets (depending on λ).
For our purposes, an ideal family of functions F would have the following
properties. For each public key k, there are two functions {fk,b : X →
Y}b∈{0,1} that are both injective, that have the same range (equivalently,
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(b, x) 7→ fk,b(x) is 2-to-1), and that are invertible given a suitable trapdoor
tk (i.e., tk can be used to compute x given b and y = fk,b(x)). Furthermore,
the pair of functions should be claw-free: it must be hard for an attacker
to find two pre-images x0, x1 ∈ X such that fk,0(x0) = fk,1(x1). Finally,
the functions should satisfy an adaptive hardcore bit property, which is
a stronger form of the claw-free property: assuming for convenience that
X = {0, 1}w, we want it to be computationally infeasible to simultaneously
generate (b, xb) ∈ {0, 1}×X and a non-zero string d ∈ {0, 1}w such that with
a non-negligible advantage over 12 the equation d · (x0⊕x1) = 0 holds, where
x1−b is defined as the unique element such that fk,1−b(x1−b) = fk,b(xb).
Unfortunately, we (as well as Brakerski et al.) do not know how to
construct a function family that exactly satisfies all these requirements under
standard cryptographic assumptions. Instead, Brakerski et al. construct a
family that satisfies slightly relaxed requirements based on the hardness of
the learning with errors (LWE) problem, and we will show that these are
still adequate for our purposes. The requirements are relaxed as follows.
First, the range of the functions is no longer a set Y; instead, it is DY , the
set of probability densities over Y. That is, each function returns a density,
rather than a point. The trapdoor injective pair property is then described
in terms of the support of the output densities: these supports should either
be identical for a colliding pair or be disjoint in all other cases.
The consideration of functions that return densities elicits an additional
requirement of efficiency: there should exist a quantum polynomial-time
procedure that efficiently prepares a superposition over the range of the
function, i.e., for any key k and b ∈ {0, 1}, the procedure can prepare a
state that is close (up to a negligible trace distance) to the state
1√X
∑
x∈X ,y∈Y
√
fk,b(x)(y)|x〉|y〉
We modify the adaptive hardcore bit requirement slightly. Since the
set X may not be a subset of binary strings, we first assume the existence
of an injective, efficiently invertible map J : X → {0, 1}w. Next, we only
require the adaptive hardcore bit property to hold for a subset of all nonzero
strings rather than for the set {0, 1}w \ {0w}. Finally, membership in the
appropriate set should be efficiently checkable, given access to the trapdoor.
Definition 25 (NTCF family). Let λ be a security parameter. Let X and
Y be finite sets. Let KF be a finite set of keys. A family of functions
F = {fk,b : X → DY}k∈KF ,b∈{0,1}
is called a noisy trapdoor claw free (NTCF) family if the following
conditions hold:
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1. Efficient Function Generation. There exists an efficient proba-
bilistic algorithm key-genF which generates a key k ∈ KF together
with a trapdoor tk:
(k, tk)← key-genF (1λ) .
2. Trapdoor Injective Pair. For all keys k ∈ KF the following condi-
tions hold.
(a) Trapdoor: For all b ∈ {0, 1} and x 6= x′ ∈ X , Supp(fk,b(x)) ∩
Supp(fk,b(x′)) = ∅. Moreover, there exists an efficient determin-
istic algorithm INVF such that for all b ∈ {0, 1}, x ∈ X and
y ∈ Supp(fk,b(x)), INVF (tk, b, y) = x.
(b) Injective pair: There exists a perfect matching Rk ⊆ X ×X such
that fk,0(x0) = fk,1(x1) if and only if (x0, x1) ∈ Rk.
3. Efficient Range Superposition.14 There exists an efficient proce-
dure SAMPF that on input k and b ∈ {0, 1} prepares a state |ψ′〉 which
has a negligible trace distance to the state
|ψ〉 = 1√|X | ∑
x∈X ,y∈Y
√
(fk,b(x))(y)|x〉|y〉 .
4. Adaptive Hardcore Bit. For all keys k ∈ KF the following condi-
tions hold, for some integer w that is a polynomially bounded function
of λ.
(a) For all b ∈ {0, 1} and x ∈ X , there exists a set Gk,b,x ⊆ {0, 1}w
such that Prd←U{0,1}w [d /∈ Gk,b,x] is negligible, and moreover there
exists an efficient algorithm that checks for membership in Gk,b,x
given k, b, x and the trapdoor tk.
(b) There is an efficiently computable injection J : X → {0, 1}w,
such that J can be inverted efficiently on its range, and such that
the following holds. If
Hk =
{
(b, xb, d, d · (J(x0)⊕ J(x1))) |
b ∈ {0, 1}, (x0, x1) ∈ Rk, d ∈ Gk,0,x0 ∩Gk,1,x1
}
, 15
Hk = {(b, xb, d, c) | (b, x, d, c⊕ 1) ∈ Hk
}
,
(8)
14Here we use a slightly weaker (and simpler) definition compared to Brakerski et al.
Our definition follows from theirs by using Lemma 2 in [BCM+18], which relates the
Hellinger distance to the trace distance.
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then for any quantum polynomial-time procedure A there exists
a negligible function µ(·) such that∣∣∣ Pr
(k,tk)←key-genF (1λ)
[A(k) ∈ Hk]− Pr
(k,tk)←key-genF (1λ)
[A(k) ∈ Hk]
∣∣∣
≤ µ(λ) .
(9)
Theorem 26 (Informal). Under the assumption that the Learning With
Errors (LWE) problem with certain parameters is hard for BQP, an NTCF
family exists.
The hardness definition of LWE and the exact parameters required for
the theorem above are given in [BCM+18, Theorem 26].
D The Advantage of Memoryless Money
When discussing any form of quantum money, we must consider the moti-
vation, i.e., the benefits over classical constructions – for example, we could
construct a rudimentary private classical money scheme in the following
way: upon minting, the bank would produce a random serial number sig-
nificantly long for some security parameter λ and sign it using a MAC. The
bank would maintain a database of all banknotes that have already been
spent, and upon verification, after verifying the MAC tag of the banknote,
the bank would search for its serial number within the database – if it’s
not there, the verification succeeds and the serial number is added to the
database, and if it is there the bank would know the money was already
spent and thus verification will fail.
This scheme is counterfeit-resistant according to our security definitions.
However, it is memory-dependent (also known as state-based); i.e., the bank
has to maintain a database to represent an ongoing state, remembering the
banknotes that were spent. On its own, a memory-dependent protocol is
not a terrible problem; many services maintain a database. This, how-
ever, becomes a liability when considering multiple branches of the same
bank: the memory-dependent information must be transferred between the
branches because the protocols maintain a state. This, other than introduc-
ing the need to maintain constant communication between all branches, can
compromise the security of the scheme, e.g, in the event where the same
banknote is presented for verification with two branches simultaneously: it
could be accepted by both branches before information of its verification
propagates between them.
15Note that although both x0 and x1 are referred to to define the set Hk, only one of
them, xb, is explicitly specified in any 4-tuple that lies in Hk.
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Constructing a memory-dependent (classical) private money scheme is
trivial – the scheme above is an extremely simple example – so such a con-
struction is not particularly interesting. The case is different, however, in
the public setting; constructing even a memory-dependent scheme that is
publicly secure is challenging, and thus such a construction would be an
interesting result. As was mentioned in the introduction, we will present a
construction of a memory-dependent public semi-quantum money scheme in
a future version.
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